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IPOs and the Slow Death of Section 5
Donald C. Langevoort∗ and Robert B. Thompson+

Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 is slowly dying. We have to
be careful about making such a bold-sounding claim because Section 5
performs two distinct legal functions. First, it creates a presumption that
offerings of securities using the facilities of interstate commerce have to be
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
Elsewhere, we and others have described the momentous shifts in the
pattern of exemptions that allow issuers to avoid registration, especially
after the JOBS Act of 2012. 1 This function is very much alive, albeit in
ways that to us seem to push in the direction of more unregistered capital
raising transactions rather than more public offerings.
That is not the aspect of Section 5 that concerns us here, however.
A separate function takes up almost all of Section 5’s statutory text:
restraining the marketing of registered public offerings so that salesmanship
does not run ahead of the mandatory disclosure that is supposed to inform
investor decisions of whether to buy or not, something often referred to as
“gun-jumping.” 2 This is a devolution we find interesting and insufficiently
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examined in legal scholarship. Our focus will be entirely on the initial
public offering (“IPO”), the paradigmatic form of issuer capital-raising, and
not offerings by seasoned issuers. 3
We describe this as a slow death because it began almost as soon as
the Act was passed. As we shall see in Part I, Section 5 started as a simple,
rigid and coherent rule that limited sales efforts to after the SEC had
declared the registration statement “effective.” The industry found this
impracticable and to some extent just ignored it, setting in motion two
decades of negotiations as to a proper balance between the demand for preeffective marketing and the concerns about gun-jumping. A legislative
compromise, eventually reached in 1954, gave us the statutory language
that is mostly still with us today. The 1954 amendments created the three
distinct time periods in a registered public offering that beginning securities
law students still struggle to master: the pre-filing period during which
offers and sales were forbidden; 4 the waiting period during which oral (but
not written) offers were allowed; 5 and the post-effective period, where sales
occur and final prospectuses are delivered. 6
For many decades, however, this compromise had considerable bite.
It generated what we call the quiet period, during which issuers and
underwriters had to limit severely what they said outside of the statutory
prospectus (and how and when they might say it) if the communication
might in any way “whet the appetite” of investors and thus be an illegal
offer. 7 Gradually, quiet period practices emerged that put pressure on
Section 5’s awkward distinctions, especially as between oral and written
communications. In response to these and other concerns in a time of rapid
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technological evolution, 8 the SEC acted in 2005 to thoroughly restructure
the public offering environment through an extensive set of rule-based
exemptions and safe harbors (the “2005 Reforms”). 9 Section 5 lost much of
its heft as a result. 10 In subtle and striking ways that have thus far received
mostly superficial analysis, the JOBS Act recently took away even more
with respect to most IPOs. 11
Our aim here is to document all this, and assess the current state of
Section 5’s fragile health. To document and assess is not necessarily to
criticize. The compromise reflected in Section 5 was conceptually
incoherent from the beginning, and tied to an understanding of the public
offering process that quickly became outdated. Perhaps the quiet period
was not that good an idea in the first place, or the markets have changed
enough to demand a new regulatory regime. 12 In Part II, we turn to a brief
survey of the contemporary literature in financial economics on IPOs.
Legal scholars have paid attention to certain aspects of the economics of
public offerings, particularly the persistent underpricing that occurs and the
abuses that ensue in allocating scarce shares. 13 But by and large, the
prevailing view of Section 5 among lawyers still seems rooted in an overly
8
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Spinning in a Hot IPO: Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 2023 (2002). The perceived abuses coming out of all this because the subject of
SEC and FINRA rulemaking, see COX ET AL., supra, note 2 at 135-36, as well as extensive
class action litigation.
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simplistic and archaic impression of the offering process. The persistence
of book-building as the standard mechanism for U.S. (and to a large extent
global) public offerings, and the value embedded in it of facilitating the
flow of information from the purchasers to the underwriter and visa versa,
reveals a complex negotiation between underwriters and institutional buyers
that helps explain much of what is happening prior to the effective date of
the registration statement, from which we can learn a great deal.
Our principal claim in Part II is that the demise of Section 5’s
communication rules is best understood as an embrace of book-building,
facilitating the two-way communication process on which that practice
depends. But we also consider what might have been lost in this
remarkable transformation of the selling rules. Because book-building
involves communications with presumably sophisticated institutional
investors, it becomes easy to doubt that there is much if any need for
protection at all. But the finance literature also stresses the complex
interplay between these institutional negotiations and the stimulation of
largely retail investor-driven demand in the secondary trading market,
which was once clearly within Section 5’s constraint but is less so after
deregulation.
To assess whether investors are better off or not as a result, we turn
to two main justifications that have been given for the deregulation. The
first is that any loss in prophylactic protection can be made up for by the
threat of liability, particularly with an enhanced Section 12(a)(2). We find
this unpersuasive for a variety of reasons. The other—amply visible in the
long history of Section 5—is a faith in the “filtration” process, that retail
investors gain protection because of the availability of the preliminary
prospectus during the waiting period to those involved in the selling process
if not the investors themselves. Here again we are not particularly
convinced, as we explain in Part III. Putting aside the biased incentives that
affect filtration, much of what is most important—and conveyed privately
to the institutions in the course of book-building—is forward-looking
information that probably need not appear in the formal disclosure, whether
preliminary or final. None of this is an argument for returning to the old
prophylactics of Section 5. But it is cause for the SEC and FINRA to pay
closer attention to the retail investor effects of the IPO sales process,
especially in the post-JOBS Act era.

4

Before we begin, some basics are in order for those not especially
familiar with public offerings. 14 An issuer seeking to raise capital in a
public offering must first prepare and file a detailed disclosure document
with the SEC, called the registration statement, and then await the staff’s
approval before actually selling the securities. When satisfied that
disclosure is adequate and selling can begin, the staff declares the
registration statement “effective.” The document that conveys the required
information to investors (taken directly from the registration statement) is
the statutory prospectus, which has both a preliminary and final form.
IPOs in the United States are generally done on a fixed-price basis.
Roughly at the same time of the effective date, the issuer sells the entire
amount of newly-issued securities at a discount to a syndicate of
underwriters, who—directly or through other dealers—then quickly turn
around and resell to investors at the price set forth in the registration
statement, a process referred to as a firm-commitment underwriting. The
investors who purchase directly from the syndicate will ordinarily be a mix
of institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds, etc.) and “retail”
investors (households and individuals of varying degrees of sophistication),
but usually more the former than the latter. Contemporaneous with the
public offering the issuer will typically list its securities on a securities
exchange, so that secondary trading of the newly issued securities begins
immediately. Investors who were not allocated shares by the underwriters
in the initial round can thus acquire shares on the open market, albeit at the
market price prevailing at the time of their purchase rather than at the fixed
price. Their sellers will be investors who received initial allocations and
quickly “flip” those shares, or the underwriters. For a period of time after
the start of trading, the underwriters will take steps to assure that the market
price of the securities stays at or—preferably—above the fixed offering
price.
Book-building is the effort that occurs prior to the effective date,
mainly during the waiting period, as the underwriters negotiate over
offering terms with sophisticated institutional investors who are key
potential investors. What they learn in these negotiations helps them set the
offering price, the economics of which we will consider in Part II. There
14
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we will see that the offering price will deliberately be set below what the
market is likely to demand when secondary trading begins after the
effective date.

I. SECTION 5’S RESTRAINTS ON MARKETING: A DEVOLUTION IN FOUR ACTS

The Securities Act of 1933 radically changed the legal structure
governing how securities are sold in this country, first requiring that the full
story about the company and its securities be told through the medium of a
registration statement (and its statutory prospectus), and second blocking
alternative channels of communication that might distort or preempt the
statutorily required story. The first eighty years in some ways can be seen
as a long retreat from the stark language of the statute’s prohibition against
communication, a story that divides into four distinct regulatory eras.
While the deregulatory direction is unmistakable, we see themes that
show a more nuanced approach through all four eras attuned to broader
themes of how information gets to investors and the price discovery that
goes on in a pre-selling of IPOs where communication between market
makers and potential buyers can be seen as aiding investor protection. That
doesn’t mean that the balance is not difficult and that the government can
yield to political and industry pressure as to deregulatory changes, but it
does require a more detailed analysis.

A. The Ban on Communications (and Selling) Before the Effective
Date under the Original 1933 Template

President Franklin Roosevelt, in proposing securities legislation to
the Congress in the first month of his administration, set out a goal “to put
the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller.” 15 The President’s
message also highlighted concern about high pressure sales tactics that had
produced “severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the
15
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part of many persons and corporations selling securities.” 16 A prominent
study of securities markets described as sales tactics designed “to induce
customers to buy, rather than to inform them….[T]he guiding principles,
and the devices were those that had been successfully employed in the
fields of advertising and salesmanship.” 17 The heart of the ‘33 Act was
section 5(a) with two broad prohibitions. First, no security could be sold
unless a registration statement was in effect with the extensive disclosure
about a company and its securities required by the Act; 18 second, sales
effort by other means were banned until that filing had been reviewed by a
federal agency and declared effective. 19
In the first two decades under the ‘33 Act, industry practices quickly
pushed beyond the seeming bright-line prohibition on selling before the
effective date of a registration statement while early agency regulators
focused on distinguishing those communications that were helpful to
investors (those that were “prospectus like”) and those that were worrisome
(those that indicated hard core selling). From the beginning it was clear the
new law did not ban all communications by the issuer or underwriters. Face
to face communications or other exchanges that did not take place via a
means of intrastate commerce were not covered. The Federal Trade
Commission, charged with administering the new act during its first year,
quickly declared (as suggested by the House Committee report) that issuers
could distribute circulars “clearly and unmistakably marked [as]
informative only, negativing without equivocation either impliedly or
expressly an intent to solicit offers to buy or to make an offer to sell.”20
This introduced a conceptual dilemma of distinguishing between
communication and solicitation that Professor Louis Loss said was to
16

Id.
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITIES MARKETS (1935) at 566-67.
18
15 U.S.C. §77e(a) (prohibiting sale or delivery of security unless registration statement
in effect). See §§7, 10 and Schedule A for the material required in a registration statement
19
15 U.S.C. §77e(a) (1933) (prohibiting offer to sell or offer to buy unless registration
statement in effect). This language was moved into a new section 5(c) in 1954 and made
applicable only to the period before the filing of a registration statement. See notes infra.
After the effective date, sales communications could occur by free writing so long as the
final prospectus had already been sent or given to the person receiving the communication
or accompanied the communication. See 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(10) exempting free writing from
the definition of “prospectus” after the effective date, removing these communications
from Section 5(b)’s otherwise blanket ban on the use of any prospectus that didn’t meet the
requirements of section 10. See 15 U.S.C. §77e(b).
20
Sec. Act. Rel. 70 (1933); see H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong. 1st Sess 12-13 (1933).
17
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“plague both the Commission and the industry for twenty-one years” (i.e.
until the 1954 amendments). 21
During this first era, the SEC (to whom the administration of the Act
was transferred in 1934 after the SEC’s formation) focused its efforts on
adaptations of the section 10 prospectus that would be permissible prior to
the effective date of the registration statement. General Counsel opinions
issued in 1935 and 1936 supported industry use of what would become the
“red herring” prospectus and blue card summaries of prospectuses. 22 The
first refers to the red legend added to the communication disaffirming any
intent to offer to sell, and the second to 5” x 8” cards sold by Standard &
Poor’s to underwriters and dealers and their circulation among customers
summarizing the registration statement material. 23
Clearly the SEC contemplated that the information in the
registration statement would be circulated during the waiting period.24
James Landis, one of the principal drafters of the statute and the
Commission’s second chair, described the introduction of the “completely
novel” concept of the waiting period in section 5 as providing the
opportunity “for the financial world to acquaint itself with the basic data
underlying the security issue and through the acquaintance to circulate
among the buying public as well as independent dealers some intimation of

21

LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed 1961) at 187.
Securities Act Release 464 (1935); Securities Act Release 802 (1936).
23
See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION (3D ED.) at 396-398. Other
related actions during this first period include: (i) the SEC’s April 1945 statement of policy
that it would not accelerate the effective date of a registration statement if an inaccurate red
herring prospectus had been circulated and not corrected; (ii) the promulgation of Rule 131
in December 1946 that a red herring was not generally an offer; (iii) the promulgation of
Rule 132 in October 1952 providing a brief identifying statement covering no more than 16
specified topic would not be considered an offer the SEC’s attendant statement of its
acceleration policy. See Securities Act Release 3453 (1952).
24
LOSS 2D ED., supra note 21 at 187. (“Although any form of pre-effective solicitation by
use of the mails or interstate facilities was categorically forbidden, the whole theory of the
waiting period was that the information contained in the registration statement would be
disseminated so that the investing public would be able to make an intelligent
determination whether to buy when the statement became effective”); Address of SEC
Chair James J. Caffrey, September 27, 1946 at 3 ( in discussing red herring prospectus,
noting “we have from the earliest days recognized that getting reliable information out to
the public during the waiting period was part of the fundamental policy of the law.”).
22
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its quality.” 25 The contemplated “acquaintance” necessarily was of an
indirect or filtration variety. The actual delivery of the prospectus to
purchasers was (and remains today) only required by statute with the
delivery of the stock certificate or the confirmation of sale, which, of
course, would not occur until after the investor was legally bound to the
contract. 26
The process by which this transmission of information was to occur
was not entirely clear. Loss described it as an apparent expectation that
underwriters and dealers “would disseminate information without in any
way puffing his wares,” a seemingly naïve assumption negated by the fact
that “salespersons are not educators, and the concept of a reluctant
salesperson soon proved to be as chimerical as the dream of a nation
without a thirst.”27 Much of the SEC’s efforts, both in this period and after
1954, seemed focused on creating incentives for issuers to distribute the
material in final prospectus before the time for delivery specified in the
statute. The statute, from its origin, has permitted free writing after the
effective date once the investor has received the final prospectus 28 and the
SEC in the pre-1954 period pursued a number of efforts to condition sales
efforts prior to the effective date on receipt of all or almost all of the
information in what would be the final prospectus by permitting a red
herring prospectus, identifying statements or other communications. 29 In a
legislative process cutoff by the advent of World War II, the SEC staff
proposed legalizing the red herring selling effort based on a condition
precedent of the investors’ receipt of a statutory prospectus before
committing to the sale. 30 But the time the discussion resumed after the war,
the SEC staff had let go of the condition precedent while accepting the legal
recognition of the red herring. Even then, the SEC chair floated the
possibility of conditioning acceleration of a registration statement on all
prospective and actual selling group members receiving a red herring
25

James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 29, 35 (1959-60).
26
15 U.S.C. §77e(b)(2).
27
LOSS 2D ED., supra, note 21 at 187.
28
15 U.S.C. §2(a) (10) (excluding free writing from definition of prospectus after the
effective date).
29
See LOSS 2D ED., supra note 21, at 187-193.
30
Id. at 199-200. Loss describes the industry’s response: permit sales immediately upon
the effective date subject to an investor’s right to rescission in the day after the sale if the
purchaser had not received the final prospectus before the sale.
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prospectus, a filtration-encouraging requirement that made its way into later
rules. 31 Professor Loss, a participant in those SEC staff discussions as a
senior staff attorney, concluded that recognizing the red-herring prospectus
for the selling document it is was “a decided improvement in the investor’s
protection even without his being guaranteed a prospectus for a minimum
period in advance of his commitment.” 32
Yet, testimony at hearings for the 1954 legislation was that the
ordinary non–institutional investors “hardly ever” saw a red herring
prospectus and for many an identifying statement either. 33 The larger issue,
that was already visible in this first period, was the ability of issuers to do
the selling they needed without the final prospectus or the red herring/
identifying statement alternatives, something they could do by oral
communications unregulated by the ’33 Act. Loss pointed to the “inability
or the unwillingness of the Commission to effectively enforce the
prohibition against pre-effective oral solicitation” by means of interstate
telephone calls as a difficulty with the ‘pre-54 statute. 34 Prior to the passage
of the ’54 amendments he described the state of affairs as “so prevalent,
[that] there is real danger that an important feature of the Securities Act“ the
ban on communications that is our focus, “will become another Prohibition
law.” 35
Why then would the SEC be willing to agree to a legislative change
in 1954 that accepted more selling (not just in red herrings but also oral
communications) without getting actual delivery of the statutory prospectus
before the investor made the purchase decision? It would be possible to see
this as reflecting a change in the political climate. This was the first time
since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 that Republicans controlled
both the White House and the Congress. Yet the core decision on this point
had been made years before when Democrats still controlled the

31

Caffrey supra note 24 at 6. This later became part of Securities Act Release #4968
(April 24, 1969). See also LOSS 2D ED., supra note 21, at 200 “The theory was that the
very imposition of the twenty-four hour requirement would act as a powerful incentive to
dissemination of the statutory prospectus during the waiting period.”
32
Id. at 254-55.
33
Hearings before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7550 and S.
2846, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) at 149-50, 158.
34
Loss 2D ED., supra note 21 at 194.
35
LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION (1951) at 255 (hereinafter “LOSS 1st Ed.,”)
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Commission.36 When the Eisenhower administration did arrive, it focused
more on budget restraint than seeking deregulatory changes in the securities
laws. 37 The Republican SEC chairman termed the ’54 legislation “modest
housekeeping” changes and couldn’t recall “any serious discussion of
substantive legislative initiatives during his chairmanship.” 38 Alternatively
it could have been an adjustment in the SEC’s attitude toward filtration.
Loss suggested that the Commission and its staff in 1941 and 1947 may
have put too much emphasis on the prospectus as the principal tool of the
disclosure philosophy, pointing instead to “other statutory and
administrative reforms which might make for a greater measure of precommitment disclosure indirectly.” 39 It seems more likely that what we see
is some recognition of the tradeoff between investor protection and selling
that carries into the later periods. It was not just a trust in filtration and
markets to sufficiently transmit the information that had been given to the
SEC, but recognition of the value of information going the other way from
purchasers to underwriters.
In discussing underwriter’s use of oral solicitation at a time that
selling was banned by statute, Loss describes the practice as based on the
underwriters’ conviction (and adds “perhaps correctly so”) that “it was
essential to the fulfillment of their function, at least if it was to be done with
reasonable safety, that they test the market before committing
themselves.” 40 Here is the precursor to the book building argument that
didn’t make its way into the legal literature for decades into the future.
Underwriters who were buying from the issuer and taking the risk of the
36

LOSS 1ST ED., supra note 35, at 251 (“After five years this difference [referring to the
Commission’s and the industry’s views in the 1941 -2 period discussed above] no longer
seemed so vital.”)
37
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed. 2003) at 267
(describing drop in the number of SEC staff.)
38
Id. at 271-272.
39
LOSS 2D ED., supra note 21, at 203.
40
Id. at 194. The “perhaps correctly so” was an addition to Loss’s second edition,
published in 1961. In the first edition in 1951, then SEC lawyer Loss quoted a SEC
commissioner characterizing the underwriters’ action as “probably not with their hearts in
their mouth, but doubtless with their tongues in their cheeks.” LOSS 1st Ed., supra note 35 at
161, quoting Address by Commissioner McConnaughey at Amos Tuck School of Business
Administration, January 22, 1948.
See also, Nathan D. Lobell, Revision of the Securities Act, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 313, 332
(1948) (gun jumping “stemmed from desire by underwriters to limit period of their risk of
less than full distribution”).
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uncertainty as to the price at which they could resale an issue for which
there was no pre-existing market information wanted to communicate with
buyers before they committed to a purchase price with the issuer. They did
it orally with nothing more than indications of interest that were not legally
binding, relying on reputation to make the process work for both sides. 41
Paul Mahoney notes that none of the prohibitions on
communications were necessary in order to achieve the simple goal of
requiring full disclosure. He prefers a rent-seeking explanation as the
source of the ban on communications, pointing to the origins of “beating the
gun” concerns in the 1920s before there were any federal securities laws
when syndicates sought to ban selling efforts prior to an agreed upon date:
“While traditionally described as mere pieces of the technical apparatus of
full disclosure, these provisions imposed important limitations on both retail
and wholesale competitors…best understood as a means to eliminate
several specific competitive techniques that low-status securities dealers
were successfully using against high-status dealers in the late 20s and early
30s.” 42 If such rent-seeking occurred, it was fairly quickly undercut by
industry participants occupying undefined space beginning in the immediate
aftermath of the passage of the ’33 Act, asserting as legitimate
communications practices seemingly banned by the ’33 Act and
aggressively negotiating with the Commission over two decades to shape
the law contrary to the initial statute. The result reflected greater space for
selling prior to the effective date that permitted price discovery, with more
practical safeguards against high pressure sales codified into the 1954
amendments.

B. Oral Communications and Broadened “Prospectus-Like”
Communications Sanctioned by the 1954 Amendments

With the 1954 legislative amendments, which remains the statutory
language still applicable today, the categorical ban on communications
receded entirely from the waiting period and only applies to the pre-filing

41
42

Loss 2D ED., supra note 21 at 194.
Mahoney, supra note 3.
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period. 43 The waiting period was opened to oral communication and greater
written communication was permitted through a preliminary prospectus, the
summary prospectus, tombstone ads, and an identifying statement. 44
In the aftermath of the amendments providing new freedom for
selling activities prior to the effective date, the regulatory focus shifted to
the perils of high pressure selling prior to the filing of the registration
statement and the use of mass media to do it. Speeches by SEC
commissioners discussed appropriate factors to govern efforts to root out
communications that would frustrate the purpose of the securities laws. 45 In
late 1957 the Commission issued a release with 10 examples that found its
way into law school casebooks for decades into the future. The release
clearly described its motivation as an effort to overcome what “apparently is
not generally understood … that the publication of information and
statements, and publicity efforts generally, made in advance of a proposed
financing, although not couched in terms of an express offer, may in fact
contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the
issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner that raised serious
question whether the publicity is not in fact part of a selling effort.” 46
Then in the fall of 1958, the Commission brought its first gun
jumping proceeding since the 1954 changes. 47 An underwriter’s publicizing
Arvida Corporation’s land developments plans that would be the basis of
the issuer’s public offering was criticized for only presenting the positive
side of the development plans. The Commission’s formal opinion which
followed the settlement of an injunction case and dismissal of an
43

Language from 5(a) was moved to (c). See Chiappinelli, supra note 7.
The original language banning offers to sell used categorical language (“by prospectus
or otherwise”) that would sweep in oral communications as well as written
communications if occurring by means of interstate commerce. In 1954 that language was
simply shifted to a new section (c) where it only applied to the pre-filing period. That left
section, 5(b)(1) to regulate selling efforts during the waiting period and its language was
not as broad, only applying to “prospectus” with no mention of “or otherwise.” Since
prospectus is limited in §2(a)(10) to only written, and not oral communications, oral offers,
after 1954, find their way into the unregulated zone.
45
See Speech of Commissioner Orrick in 1957 (discussing” thinly veiled attempts”) and
Chairman Gadsby in 1958 (companies don’t have to close PR departments).
46
Securities Act Release #3844 (Oct. 8, 1957).
47
There had been only three SEC actions regarding gun jumping prior to 1954 and only
one that would fit post-1954 structure focused on conditioning the market in the prefiling
period. See Loss 2D ED., supra note 21, at 197-97.
44
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administrative proceeding cited the direction in the Congressional
Committee Report from the 1954 legislation for the SEC to be “ever
vigilant to prevent evasion of the basic statutory approach of full
disclosure.” 48 This sentiment continued to guide SEC policy for decades
visible in the Google IPO in 2004 when the founders’ interview published
in Playboy magazine shortly before filing threatened to derail the
company’s IPO because of concern about a gun jumping communication. 49
In the period after Arvida, the SEC’s communications’ shifted to
making room for increasing information coming into the marketplace under
disclosures required by the 1934 Act and to permit information directed
toward customers, suppliers and employees. 50 The Wheat Report in 1969
expressed the concern that gun jumping had unnecessarily interfered with
normal publication activities of companies. 51 Thereafter the Commission
amended existing rules and added several new rules liberalizing
communications. 52 The changes reflected the Commission’s belief that
“widespread market following greatly lessens the potential for abuse section
5 was intended to prevent.” 53 The specific context was the integrated
disclosure system’s impact on securities issuance by companies that were
already within the disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act, but they also
reflected acceptance of the impact of market disclosures and the greater role
of institutional investors that could also impact issuances in an initial public
offering, particularly as technology opened up more channels for
information through the internet and other electronic communications.
During this period, the SEC continued its prior efforts to more
broadly disseminate the required disclosure of the final prospectus. Its 1970
promulgation of Rule 15c2-8 comes as close as securities law has ever
come to requiring that investors actually receive a copy of the full story in
48
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the statutory prospectus prior to making the decision to buy,. 54 This rule
requires broker-dealers to deliver a copy of the preliminary prospectus to
any person expected to receive a confirmation of sale at least 48 hours prior
to anticipated mailing a confirmation. 55 Yet this implementation of getting
out the full disclosure which had been discussed by securities regulators for
decades occurs in a somewhat convoluted way, not as part of a 1933 Act
rule-making but as part of 1934 Act provisions regulating the deceptive acts
of broker-dealers more generally.
Industry practices continued to develop that focused on
communications outside of the regulated channels. Road shows permitted
issuers and the selling group to both sell and get feedback from potential
purchasers about their interest and the price they would be willing to pay. 56
When advances in communications technology permitted road show
presentations to be distributed to those that could not be physically present,
the SEC deemed these communications not be a prospectus. 57
The finance literature was quicker than the legal literature to connect
these changes in communications policy to book building and the economic
function of price discovery in the IPO process, with the underwriter acting
as a reputational intermediary between issuers and investors as discussed in
Part II. 58 While there remains debate in the finance and legal community
about the reach of these theories, the unwillingness of the SEC to
implement a broad ban on communication reflects recognition of the value
of price discovery.
Underpricing is a more visible illustration of this tension between
communications and the process of price discovery in the IPO process.
Although there were a couple of isolated references to underpricing in the
54
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legal literature as far back as the 1940s, it was not until the mid 1980s that
the topic seemed to reach a critical mass of attention in the legal literature. 59
Some of the discussion of this era tracked the idea put forward earlier of the
underwriter’s risk in making a market that can be reduced by underpricing,
with a sometimes recurring theme that underwriters were taking advantage
of the process. 60 Even so, the legal literature was a good ways behind the
finance discussion of book building and underpricing’s relation to the
underwriter’s price discovery process in discussions with buyers based on
the underwriter’s role as a reputational intermediary, to be discussed in Part
II.

C. The 2005 Reforms

By the turn of the most recent century, many accommodations had
been made to the practicalities of book-building, but the 1954 revisions
were still amply visible in establishing the basic regulatory framework for
IPOs. Gun-jumping liability remained a significant threat, at least as
enforced (with considerable discretion) by the SEC staff. In 2005, however,
there was something of a revolution.
The 2005 reforms were decades in the making, largely driven by the
frustration of applying the stringent public offering rules to seasoned issuers
when so much information is already available about them as a result of
their public company status under the Securities Exchange Act. 61
Fortunately we can ignore most of these reforms for our discussion, either
because they do not apply to IPOs or, even if they do, because they do not
involve Section 5’s communication rules.
Two major changes, however, did significantly affect the IPO
process—one for the pre-filing period, the other post-filing. New Rule
163A created a limited 30-day window prior to the filing of the registration
59
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statement during which the quiet period attaches; offering communications
by the issuer (not underwriters or dealers) before that time are excluded
from the definition of offer, and hence from the prohibition in Section
5(c). 62 In other words, the duration of the pre-filing period is shortened
considerably, and issuers are free to “hype” up until the appointed time so
long as their communications do not reference the forthcoming public
offering and efforts are made to assure that the publicity is not repeated
within the 30-day period. 63
The SEC’s explanation was that hyping that occurs more than thirty
days out is unlikely to have an on-going conditioning effect on investors by
the time they make their decisions to buy. 64 While the Commission is no
doubt right that publicity’s effects do dissipate over time, we can at least
wonder whether concerted efforts to create a buzz about a company and its
prospects don’t have lingering effects in terms of follow up word-of-mouth,
journalistic coverage, etc. It may be naïve to think that publicity that whets
the appetite of potential investors ceases to have that effect so quickly.
Even though there is the prohibition on referencing the forthcoming
offering, the issuer has the freedom to make such an announcement
separately pursuant to long-standing Rule 135—the market for IPOs can
then easily make the connection. 65
The other major reform affecting IPO communications—one of the
headline changes in the 2005 revisions—was the authorization for the issuer
and offering participants to use “free writing prospectuses” (“FWP”) after
the filing of a registration statement containing a bona fide expected price
range. 66 FWPs are written marketing material of any sort—e-mails, term
sheets, sales literature, media publicity. 67 The relevant safe harbor rules
(Rules 164 and 433) are mind-numbingly complicated but boil down to
three possibilities, depending on who is responsible for the material and
how or to whom it is communicated: (1) the inclusion of a legend warning
readers that a prospectus is/will be available and should be read; (2)
attachment of the most recent preliminary prospectus, which may be via

62
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64
65
66
67

17 CFR §230.163A.
17 CFR §230.163A(a).
Id. at 44740.
17 CFR §230.135.
17 CFR §230.164.
17 CFR §230.405.
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hyperlink for electronic materials; and (3) filing with the SEC. 68 This is
truly “free writing” in that there are no limitations on what can be said or
how it can be communicated, so long as there is no inconsistency with what
is in the registration statement.
This is a vast oversimplification of the FWP regime, 69 but enough
for our purposes. What is amply clear is the SEC had abandoned its 1954
philosophy that had tried to make the preliminary prospectus and similar
documents the only written communications containing the kind of
information that could make an investor want to purchase up until the
effective date. The new philosophy was one of free communication (albeit
with some combination of the three conditions) of whatever the offering
participants want to say, so long as the best available prospectus is available
to counter any overly optimistic implications from the FWPs.
The SEC was unapologetic about this profound change, making
clear that the passage of time and evolution in information technology had
made the old oral/written distinction both anachronistic and unwise. 70 This
reform unleashed opportunities for much more aggressive selling efforts
during the waiting period. Acknowledging this, the Commission said that
any excesses should be curbed not by prior restraint but by the threat of
liability if what is said in the FWP is actually false or misleading. 71 To this
end, the 2005 reforms revised the liability rules under Section 12(a)(2) of
the Securities Act, a provision that allows purchasers to recover against
their sellers if sales are made, negligently, by means of a false or misleading
“prospectus or oral communication.” 72 Notably, the reforms purported to
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expand issuer liability, even when the issuer is a step or two removed from
the plaintiff-purchaser. 73 We will come back to all this in Part III.
We will turn soon to whether all this is good policy or not. For now,
simply appreciate the extraordinary turn away from the statutory structure
created in 1954. Until 2005, the IPO lawyer’s job was often simply to say
no to an issuer or underwriter that wanted to promote the forthcoming
offering in a way that ran afoul of Sections 5(b) or 5(c)—any selling efforts
before filing, and written solicitations afterwards. Now, except in the brief
thirty day window prior to filing, the desired selling efforts could occur,
with the lawyer simply assessing whether the communication needed a
legend or attachment, had to be filed, or was false or misleading. The
edifice built in 1954—itself a compromise from what had been enacted in
1933—had largely been torn down.

D. The JOBS Act Relief for Emerging Growth Companies

The 2005 reforms barely had time to become familiar before the
financial collapse and global recession destabilized much of finance. As the
U.S. struggled to regain its economic vigor, efforts to promote capital
formation and hoped-for job creation became a priority for the nation’s
lawmakers. The JOBS Act of 2012 was a largely bipartisan response that
specifically sought to encourage more IPOs by eliminating some of the
regulatory burdens new public issuers face under both the ’33 and ’34
Acts—building a so-called “on-ramp” for issuers that qualify as emerging
growth companies (“EGCs”). 74

73
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As with the 2005 reforms, we can ignore much of this deregulation.
To be sure, there are aspects of the IPO deregulation that are controversial
and deserve close attention, like the invitation for new issuers to make a
confidential filing of their registration statement. But they do not involve
Section 5’s communication rules, and so are not our concern here.
There are two major changes that do. The first, in new Section 5(d),
is the authorization for both issuers and offering participants to
communicate in the pre-filing period with accredited institutional investors
in order to “test the waters” before committing to a public offering. 75 This
goes well beyond the 2005 reforms because it enables conversations that
focus specifically on the possible offering, and invites underwriters to take
part. This is a moderate reform insofar as it limits contacts to those with
presumably sophisticated institutions. It can be seen as a form of pre-bookbuilding, though no doubt the intention is to allow conversations with key
investors as to whether the offering is worth doing in the first place.
The second is far more interesting, and requires a bit of background.
Broker-dealer firms have long provided so-called sell-side research on
publicly-traded companies, including recommendations to buy, sell, or hold.
Were research to be initiated at the time of an IPO, it would presumably
violate Section 5, as a written “offer” by an underwriter or dealer, whether
or not the research was published by a deal participant. 76
For offerings by seasoned issuers, the SEC has for some time had
safe harbor rules that enable research to occur or continue even though a
public offering is taking place. The most sensitive of these is Rule 139,
which sets the conditions under which even underwriters—with an obvious
self-interest in promoting the offering—can continue to publish research. 77
But Rule 139 has never been available with respect to IPOs. 78 Around the
time the tech-stock bubble burst a little more than a decade ago, ample
evidence arose that underwriters were using the promise of favorable
research coverage as a means of obtaining investment banking business but
harming purchasers. The resulting scandals led to a variety of restrictions
designed to build a “wall” between research and banking. Research by deal
75
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participants was impermissible until the offering was complete and (by
FINRA rule) insider lock-ups had expired. 79
Whether all this was something of an over-reaction is debatable. 80
Positive research does make issuers more visible to investors, supporting a
higher market valuation. The overall decline in the number of analysts
covering smaller issuers, particularly after the introduction of
decimalization reduced spreads in traded stocks, has sometimes been cited
as a reason for the decline in IPOs. The IPO community took the JOBS Act
as an opportunity to seek relief, and Congress delivered. Research analysts
were given the freedom to take more of a role in discussions with potential
issuers, and underwriters and other deal participants could initiate coverage
at the time of the offering. 81
This was controversial enough—obviously, the pressure on analysts
will be to help sell the stock and support the after-market. But those
conflicts are fully disclosed, and other regulatory restrictions remain in
place, so that the precise effects to this new form of sales pressure are hard
to estimate. 82 We can almost certainly put this reform in the category of
trading lower investor protection for enhanced capital formation, but it is
not clear by how much. But the controversy over this amply visible
deregulation almost completed obscured a much bigger impact on Section
5.
The proponents of enhanced sell-side research at the time of an
offering wanted to promote oral as well as published research. For this the
standard regulatory safe-harbor description of research then in use would
not work—the SEC had, as recently as the 2005 reforms, refused to extend
the safe-harbors to oral dissemination of recommendations. 83 Instead, the
JOBS Act alters the definition of both “offer” and “prospectus” (the key
words in Section 5) to exclude a research report, with research report then
79
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defined to mean any “written, electronic, or oral communication [by a
broker or dealer] that includes information, opinions or recommendations
with respect to the securities of an [EGC] . . . whether or not it provides
information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment
decision.” 84
One can see how this might seem necessary to authorize the oral
communication of sell-side research, and the phrase referring to “reasonably
sufficient” simply takes from language drafted by the SEC in 2005. 85 But
step back and ask whether there any form of salesmanship by an offering
participant—even e-mail spam—that is not effectively eliminated from
Section 5 when the issuer is an EGC. If read literally, this takes out of
Section 5’s communication rules the very sort of action that section is most
concerned with: sales efforts to whet the appetite of investors, whether prefiling or during the waiting period. With respect to underwriters and
dealers, it leaves Section 5(b) and (c) an empty shell.
All this was largely missed in the immediate aftermath of the JOBS
Act. 86 Once the SEC realized what had happened, it engaged in nonacquiescence, 87 apparently believing that Congress’ intent could not have
been such a thorough gutting of the statute. We will have to see how all this
eventually plays out, but in a world of textualist statutory interpretation, it is
hard to see how Congress’ words mean anything except what they literally
say. To this point, the industry has been cautious in using the new freedom
it was given as a result of the research rule reforms—other parts of the
securities laws permit the SEC and FINRA to respond to overreaching
here—but the potential breadth of the change is startling. 88
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E. Summary

Even if we put aside the JOBS Act research reforms, Section 5 is
now a far different, less fearsome restraint on the IPO selling process than it
once was. It reflect a faith that selling efforts are not so troubling as long as
a preliminary or final prospectus is available to the potential investor and/or
the investment professionals involved on both the sell and buy sides. We
are thus left with the question of whether Section 5’s slow death—and the
more vigorous selling efforts that have evolved—should trouble us.

II. EVALUATING SECTION 5’S DEMISE

A. The Economics of IPOs

IPOs can be promoted much more aggressively in light of the
changes detailed in Part I. Determining whether this is problematic best
begins by looking at the economics of the IPO process, one of the most
thoroughly-studied subjects in finance.
Almost by definition, an IPO is about price formation in the absence
of a fair interplay of supply and demand that sets an equilibrium market
price. That is to say, up to the time of trading (and probably a while
thereafter), there is no reliable objective measure of the value of the
security, and in all likelihood substantial subjective disagreement. 89 So a

communications that would apply to the kinds of communications seemingly excluded
from “offer” and “prospectus.” See id.
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demand curve has to be created, and book-building—eliciting non-binding
bids from sophisticated institutional investors as a result of the sequence of
closed road shows and private communications—is the dominant solution to
how to go about finding the optimal fixed offering price. 90
One of the enduring puzzles in finance has to do with the predictable
underpricing of IPOs as an artifact of book-building. Over the past decades,
with a high degree of regularity, the short-term secondary market price rises
after the effective date, often considerably—the so-called “pop” in the stock
price. That suggests that the fixed offering price could have been higher, so
that the issuer has left money on the table by not taking sufficient advantage
of the demand for its securities. We have to be careful here, because the
prevailing market price reflects the demand for single shares rather than the
amount that it would take to find enough buyers to take the issuer’s entire
supply. But even so, the magnitude of the underpricing requires
explanation.
The standard account is informational, which is often put forward to
justify the entire enterprise of book-building. Institutional investors have
private information—the product of their own proprietary research as well
as their own demand preferences—that is costly to reveal. They will not be
open and candid with the underwriters unless given a credible commitment
that they will be compensated, and so book-building will fail. Underpriced
allotments are the solution: the underwriters make an implicit promise that
in this or subsequent offerings they will be paid for the value of the
information embedded in their bids, based on how forthcoming and
aggressive they are. Because underwriters and these large institutions deal
with each other repeatedly, reputational incentives suffice.
Here the controversy begins. Accepting this basic premise, is the
underpricing no more than necessary to induce the key investors’ candor
and participation? Although underwriters are formally limited to their 7%
spread in terms of their own compensation, they might be able to favor their
repeat institutional customers by underpricing more aggressively and
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getting soft dollar kickbacks in return. 91 The IPO scandals in the aftermath
of the tech stock bubble a little more than a decade ago exposed some of
these temptations. 92 But won’t issuers—who are hardly unsophisticated—
learn to resist this exploitation? Maybe not, for a variety of reasons.
Perhaps there is collusive behavior by the securities industry that makes
issuer resistance difficult, or maybe underpricing is palatable to the issuer
because it provides some insurance against the draconian liability that the
Securities Act generates. The most common explanation, however, is that
the issuer’s insiders see personal profit opportunity in the underpricing
because the “pop” may enable greater profits when they sell their own
shares later on, when lock-up agreements expire. 93
These are not Section 5 problems, however, at least not directly. If
book-building is about a delicate negotiation between the underwriters and
institutional investors leading to systematic underpricing of IPOs, we need
not worry about these investors. While there will be retail investors as well
in the initial round of sales, the fixed-price offering means they will get the
same mark-down as the institutions. Thus, in the absence of retail-only
IPOs, we might reasonably wonder why we need Section 5’s sales
restrictions at all. Institutional investors presumably do not need to be told
to wait and read the prospectus before deciding to invest if they find that
information necessary or valuable (which certainly justifies the JOBS Act’s
new Section 5(d)).
We may have to be somewhat cautious here, however. One of the
insights of the economics literature is that underwriters and preferred
customers (the major institutions) are repeat players whose interactions
extend among many offerings. An institution might make a generous bid in
one offering with the expectation that it is helping out the underwriters now,
expecting compensation in other ways or other deals. So, we cannot be
entirely confident that the institutional pricing mechanism assures fairness
in any given deal. Moreover, institutions can exit fairly quickly in the
aftermarket, relying on the underpricing for short-term protection. 94 While
91
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underwriters naturally want to discourage too much early flipping, this is all
negotiable.
In any event, the major Section 5 problems are less likely to arise
from book-building solicitations than from the impact of the offering on
secondary market trading. 95 Under-pricing is a function of the difference
between the fixed offering price and the likely after-market price; the higher
the latter, the more valuable the allocations. For that reason alone,
underwriters will try to stimulate investor demand beyond the initial round
of buyers. Moreover, a threat to include more retail investors in a
particularly hot offering might encourage the institutions to be more
generous in their book-building bids. To the extent that issuer insiders are
anxious to take advantage of lock-up expirations occurring a while after the
effective date, they, too, will reward underwriters who work to stimulate
secondary market demand. Recent empirical evidence supports the idea
that such stimulation is part of the underwriters’ job, for which they are well
compensated. 96 The evolution of social media (Twitter, Facebook,
Linkedin, etc.) has expanded the mechanisms for doing this.
Assessing this is difficult, however, because offering participants are
hardly the sole cause of positive investor sentiment in anticipation of an
IPO. The financial media covets emerging growth company stories,
especially among issuers with visible brand names, and can hype without
prompting. Investor enthusiasm can spread virus-like by word of mouth or
the electronic equivalent, amply visible through simple tools like counting
Google searches for pre-IPO issuers. 97 Identifying or measuring how much
offering participants induce enthusiasm, then, is impossible in a noisy
financial marketplace. But the studies noted above make clear enough that
efforts in this direction are expected, with compensation that is presumably
not for nothing.
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A circumstantial case for these IPO marketing practices follows
from a well-known anomaly: that even though underpricing is clear, in the
long run IPOs underperform. 98 That is to say, the predictable profit
opportunities may disappear fairly quickly, and investors who buy
(especially in the aftermarket) and hold IPOs over a longer time horizon do
not do that well. There are many explanations given for this, including
timing (issuers make their IPOs when at the top of their game 99), financial
reporting (issuers take advantage of accounting discretion to maximize their
current profitability and/or growth at the expense of future reporting) and
the aggressive marketing of the IPO itself. The steady increase in the
supply of stock for sale and borrowing, which facilitates short-selling, also
puts downward pressure on the price that was missing in the early days of
trading. Arguably, sophisticated investors in IPOs may know to get out
early except when they have confidence they have found one of the
winners.
We have to be careful not to overstate all this. There is evidence, for
example, that underperforming IPOs are heavily concentrated at the low
reputational end of the spectrum, where the institutional presence is
weakest. 100 Nor is it clear that aggressive media coverage necessarily
correlates with long-run underperformance. 101 Thus we cannot simply
assume the presence of rampant opportunism directed at the retail
aftermarket. But we cannot rule it out either, particularly given the cyclical
variations in capital raising patterns over time.

B. Economics Confronts Law
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The devolution of Section 5 has plainly made it easier to “pump”
IPO stocks. The 2005 reforms, as we have seen, allows even “hyping”
publicity up until 30 days before the filing of the registration statement so
long as it does not reference the offering (even though the offering can be
announced separately), and free writing prospectuses during the waiting
period can generate mass media publicity with nothing more than a filing
requirement, as well as more targeted communications via e-mail and the
internet. Backdoor hyping mechanisms like product advertising are
arguably made easier by Rule 169 even within the 30 day window,
continuing through the waiting period. 102 The JOBS Act redefinition of
“research” within the statutory definition of offer opens up even more
potential for conditioning the market prior to the effective date; the Act’s
more explicit instruction that brokers involved in the underwriting can
initiate research coverage of the EGC immediately, with predictable “buy”
recommendations, is by all accounts a freedom to pump.
None of this will come as any surprise to those familiar with the
2005 reforms or the JOBS Act, however. The drafters of both did not deny
that more aggressive publicity would result; rather, they argue that serious
abuses are unlikely. One reason has to do with institutional investors as
protectors of the retail given that offerings are fixed price. Another has to
do with the modern information environment, which gives potential
investors access to information about issuers from a wealth of sources,
presumably making public offering fraud harder to perpetrate. While there
is no doubt something to the idea that hiding the truth is more difficult
today than in the past, contemporary frauds like Enron, Worldcom and
many others show that issuer opacity remains problematic. 103 Indeed,
modern technology can amplify fads and fashions as much as it can expose
the truth. Especially without short-selling opportunities to profit from at the
time of the IPO, the few skeptical voices interested in popping a bubble of
excitement are likely to be silenced by the din of enthusiasm from those
anxious for an offering to succeed. We are thus disinclined to put too much
faith in this argument.
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C. Liability Rules

The other arguments that fear of opportunism is overblown are
largely liability-based. One is that no reform has touched the centerpiece of
the Securities Act: the registration statement with its extensive disclosures
about the issuer and the offering, which is publicly available by the time
serious marketing of the IPO commences and which—as of the effective
date—must be true and complete lest extraordinarily strict liability ensue. 104
This by itself should be a counterweight to any false or misleading hype,
which is the only hype worth worrying about. We come back to this in Part
III.
The other is that there is a set of civil liability and conduct rules that
can be relied upon to deter overreaching in the marketing of the IPO. With
respect to the expansion of research carve-outs in the JOBS Act, for
example, the drafters point to SEC and FINRA rules that are designed to
promote analyst independence from pressure from others in the investment
bank, most of which were untouched in the reforms. There are also both
substantive and procedural limits on solicitation efforts—for example,
“know your security” norms, which require brokers to be familiar with
issuer-related information before making any recommendations to
customers, 105 and communication rules that require supervisory approval of
brokers’ written outreach efforts, which now includes social media. 106 All
this relates to a point we have made elsewhere: the Securities Act was
enacted a few years before the advent of substantive broker-dealer
regulation, so that maybe the subsequent emergence of those direct controls
on the selling effort can substitute for the overbroad prophylactics in the
statute. 107
There is much to be said for this, and we could imagine a
technology-enhanced system of real-time surveillance of the sales and
marketing practices associated with IPOs and other sensitive transactions
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that would indeed justify relaxation of the statutory rules. Whether we are
at such a point is open to question, however. Our sense is that the pressure
to market aggressively will find expression in ways that are difficult to
detect or prove as violations. For example, analysts doing research do not
need to have compensation set based on their contributions to the banking
side to realize that their career prospects are better if they are in synch with
their employers’ deal flow. And investment banks can hire optimists for
this kind of work if there are any doubts, for whom genuine enthusiasm for
favored stocks comes easily. We can say the same about brokers doing
other kinds of hard-sell marketing.
But if these softer rules are not powerful enough, maybe other civil
liability rules are. The SEC was clear that their philosophy was deregulate
communications that were not necessarily troublesome and then use ex post
liability to address the abuses when they are uncovered. These include SEC
and FINRA enforcement actions, for which there is ample authority.
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, for example, creates liability for
misrepresentations or omissions in the offer or sale of a security, without
the need to prove intentional misconduct. 108 Here again, however, the
question is whether enforcement resources and detection mechanisms are up
to the task.
Private lawsuits by IPO investors add a larger dimension to the
policing of abusive marketing practices, to which SOR assigns an important
role. Putting aside for a moment situations where the registration statement
itself is false or misleading as of the effective date, two private rights of
action can be invoked: Rule 10b-5, and Section 12(a)(2).
Rule 10b-5—the general antifraud provision under the federal
securities laws—is not particularly helpful, however, outside the most
egregious of IPO cases. It requires plaintiffs to plead and prove scienter, 109
which is not always easy when offering participants seem caught up in deal
euphoria. It also has a challenging “loss causation” standard, whereby
plaintiffs have to show that their stock price losses were the product of the
revelation of the truth about what had been misrepresented, rather than other
economic factors. High-visibility cases challenging biased investment bank
research in IPOs have collapsed simply because of this difficulty. 110 But
108
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the most powerful impediment to 10b-5 litigation here is procedural: private
enforcement by investors has to take the form of a class action to be
effective, and courts have not been willing to afford plaintiffs the
presumption of reliance in the IPO context that they do in other openmarket fraud lawsuits because the IPO and immediate aftermarket trading
does not occur in an sufficiently “efficient” market. 111 Without that
presumption, the class action is simply not certified.
This leaves Section 12(a)(2), which the SEC promoted in the 2005
reforms as the primary response to fear of abusive marketing. 112 This
statutory provision allows buyers of securities to sue their sellers for
rescissory damages if securities were sold by means of a false or misleading
“prospectus or oral communication,” subject to a reasonable care
defense. 113 The statutory definition of prospectus refers to any written
offering material, upon which the Supreme Court put a gloss in the
Gustafson decision by limiting this category to offering materials used in a
public offering. 114 The 2005 reforms makes clear that in the opinion of the
SEC, marketing materials used in a registered public offering, including
free writing prospectuses, satisfy this definition. 115 The SEC also adopted a
number of rules to bolster plaintiffs’ ability to sue.
Of these, the most potent relates to the definition of seller, who is
the only permissible defendant in a 12(a)(2) suit. The case law had defined
seller as including only those who passed title to the security to the buyer
(i.e., one’s immediate seller) and those who solicit on behalf of the seller.
This creates problems in the context of the firm commitment underwriting,
because the securities would move from the issuer to the underwriters and
then perhaps another step or two before coming to rest in the hands of the
investor who claims abuse. The SEC took the view that underwriters and
other offering participants had enough of a seller role to fall within the
scope of the term as understood by the courts—which itself is a little bit of a
stretch. But what about the issuer, which stands at least a step away from
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the ultimate purchaser? The case law here was mixed, and so the SEC used
its definitional rulemaking authority in Rule 159A simply to declare the
issuer a seller for purposes of 12(a)(2) with respect to marketing material
for which it bears responsibility. 116 With this, the Commission said, victims
of abusive marketing were protected from any unfortunate consequences of
Section 5’s partial disappearance. This would include misrepresentations or
omissions in the preliminary prospectus, free writing prospectuses, or
related oral or written solicitations.
This is undermined, however, by at least four key weaknesses. As
to the widened definition of “seller” in Rule 159A, which is crucial to
effective policing, a surprisingly large number of courts have been inclined
to stick with the older case law, often not even mentioning the rule-based
change. A few have held that the SEC lacks the authority to change the
definition. 117 This may reflect a tendency observable elsewhere in securities
litigation, wherein courts are doubtful that the SEC should control the
sensitive subject of private litigation rights.
Beyond this, there is substantial doubt as to whether Section
12(a)(2) applies to secondary trading as opposed to sales by underwriters
and dealers as part of the IPO itself. The “majority opinion” seems to be
not, 118 which means that aftermarket purchasers have no recourse even if
Rule 159A stands.
The next weakness takes us back to the issue of reliance and the ease
of class certification that has been the subject of so much litigation under
Rule 10b-5. It is generally said that Section 12(a)(2) has no reliance
requirement. 119 But that construal dates back to the original idea that
prospectuses were extremely limited prior to the effective date, so that
116

17 CFR §230.159A. The Supreme Court has construed the term “seller” in Section
12(a) to include only the person who transfers title to the security to the purchaser, and any
other person who, for pecuniary benefit, solicits the transaction. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S.
622 (1988).
117
See In re Kosmos Energy Sec. Litig., 2013 WL 3196437 (N.D. Tex. 2013);
Countrywide Fin. Corp. MBS Sec. Litig., 2013 WL 1189311 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Residential Funding Co., 843 F. Supp.2d 191 (D. Mass. 2012). For a
contrary view, accepting the rule as valid, see Capital Ventures Int’l v. J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Acquisition Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19227 (D. Mass. 2013).
118
See Johnson v. Sequans Comm. S.A., 2013 WL 214279 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Rogers v.
Sterling Foster & Co., 222 F. Supp. 2d 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
119
See LOSS ET AL, supra.

32

statutorily-authorized free writing was only really a post-effective
possibility (where it received an explicit exemption from the definition of
prospectus ). 120 Thus there really was very little role for 12(a)(2) liability at
all, except with respect to offerings of exempt securities—where the
offering document was the functional equivalent of the statutory
prospectus. 121 Thus it made sense for there to be no reliance requirement
(just as there is no reliance requirement under Section 11 for false
registration statements) because the importance of that document could be
presumed. The 2005 reforms, however, radically revised this, inviting all
kinds of communications of varying degrees of visibility and import. As a
matter of common sense, 12(a)(2) will not work without some insistence
that a buyer trace his or her purchase back to the defective prospectus, and
the language in the provision that recovery is appropriate when the
securities were sold “by means of” the false prospectus invites precisely this
inquiry. 122 If so, there could be at least a backdoor reliance requirement.
And if so, it is highly likely that class certification—the key to effective
enforcement in private securities litigation—will fail. If claimants have
differing reliance explanations, courts may well insist on individualized
claims, which probably means few or no claims. To date, class certification
is still commonplace in 12(a)(2) cases, but largely in contexts where it is a
tag-a-long to Rule 10b-5 or Section 11 claims. How much weight it can
bear on its own is questionable.
The final weakness takes us back to the definition of prospectus.
We will assume that the SEC is right that the definition of prospectus is
broad enough to include free writing generally. But there are notable
exceptions. The Securities Act explicitly carved out from the definition of
prospectus any free writing after the effective date that is accompanied or
preceded by a statutory prospectus. 123 More dramatic is the effect of the
JOBS Act on EGCs. Any communication by an underwriter or dealer that
falls in the seemingly broad definition of “research” found in Section
120
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2(a)(3) is excluded from being an offer or a prospectus. Read literally, as
we have seen, that would put most if not all forms of conditioning the
market by broker-dealers entirely out of the reach of 12(a)(2).
All this suggests that 12(a)(2) may not be a very reliable policing
mechanism at all, which is troubling given how much stress the SEC put on
it in 2005. We suspect that only the SEC and FINRA can realistically
address abuses in conditioning the market, with the doubts about resources
and inclination that are inevitable when dealing with public (or quasipublic) enforcement authority. To this point, then, there is no compelling
response to the concern that the slow death of Section 5 puts IPO investors
more at risk, at least in the secondary market.

III. THE STATUTORY PROSPECTUS AND THE FILTRATION PROCESS

The great anomaly of Section 5 has been well-known almost from
its inception: it seemingly works hard to make the disclosure document (the
part of the registration statement at the effective date that constitutes the
final statutory prospectus) an effective truth-telling tool, yet rarely requires
delivery of it to the investor until after the purchase is complete. 124 One
might justify the death of Section 5 on this basis alone. But for just as long,
the reality has been that the work of disclosure is done not by the final
prospectus but by the preliminary prospectus—a filed draft of the disclosure
in final-enough form, which sets an offering price range and typically has
already been revised in response to initial SEC staff comments. 125 In
administering Section 5, the SEC has long insisted on distribution of the
preliminary prospectus to offering participants and investors who request
one; in an IPO, moreover, Rule 15c2-8 requires that each purchaser
expected to buy receive a preliminary prospectus at least 48 hours before
the sale. Attachment or linkage of the preliminary prospectus is a condition
to the use of most free writing during the waiting period. And if the SEC
staff comes to think that what is in the preliminary prospectus needs
124
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significant change, it will delay effectiveness long enough to permit
recirculation or updating. 126
This is the real function of the Securities Act, largely untouched by
the 2005 reforms or the JOBS Act. The latter does permit confidential
filings so that the early round of disclosure negotiations with the SEC can
be kept private, but road shows and other significant marketing steps cannot
take place until after the “improved” preliminary prospectus has been filed
publicly. By all accounts, misrepresentations in this document trigger
Section 12(a)(2) liability for the seller, albeit subject to the litigation caveats
stressed earlier.
In many ways, the demise of Section 5 that we have traced is most
readily defended this way. What is important is high quality disclosure
throughout the marketing period, so that overbroad marketing restrictions
are unnecessary and costly. Those who doubt that many investors actually
make much use of the disclosure itself generally justify this core set of
obligations by reference to “filtration”: that what is important during the
marketing of an IPO is that the professionals be informed of the truth about
the issuer, so that their recommendations and related activity will reflect
reality rather than hype. 127
We don’t doubt that the importance of filtration, even via
professionals with conflicts of interest (which is a larger category as a result
of the JOBS Act “research” amendments). Surely negative or qualified
facts about a company’s past limit salespeople’s ability to promote
aggressively. The problem with the statutory prospectus, preliminary or
otherwise, is that it is almost entirely historical (backwards-looking) in what
it reveals, whereas the story that drives the marketing of an IPO is about the
issuer’s future. The typical IPO issuer has shown promise; the economics
literature and common sense suggest that public offerings are timed to take
advantage of a sense of momentum at a high point in its perceived
valuation. What reasonable investors should want to know about is the
sustainability of this promise and momentum.
Litigation under the Securities Act often deals with issuers that
make public offerings not long before hitting a rough patch—product
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defects or sales slumps—that sends the stock price downward. Plaintiffs
may offer evidence that, internally, management was aware of warning
signs, perhaps even leading them to lower their private estimates of
revenues or earnings at least in the short term. They will claim that the
statutory prospectus was false and misleading for failing to reveal the
looming dangers.
Predictably, defendants will respond by stressing that the Securities
Act does not require issuers to divulge forward-looking information even if
it is material. 128 The obligation, they say, is simply to obey the SEC’s lineitem requirements and include such additional information as is necessary
to make these disclosures not misleading. For better or worse, they are
right. As a result, plaintiffs in these lawsuits are forced to argue that what
was said about past results was misleading for failure to mention the danger
signs, which is not easy unless the issuer voluntarily put the subject of
continuing or future performance in play. By and large, courts say that
truthfully revealing historical facts does not imply that the future will not be
different.
To be sure, there are a couple of line-item requirements that do turn
to the future, on which plaintiffs also seize. There is a duty to disclose
major risk factors, but this requires qualitative revelation of types of risk,
not quantitative disclosure about the likelihood or impact of those risks.
IPO lawyers are usually good about including extensive risk disclosures,
without specifics. There is also the Management Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A) portion of the statutory prospectus, which requires disclosure of
“known trends and uncertainties” that would lead an investor to doubt that
past financial performance indicates a comparable future. 129
Sometimes these arguments work, particularly where what the
company is facing evidences an “extreme departure” from its past
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success. 130 But more often, it seems, courts revert to the basic principle that
forward-looking information is not the subject of mandatory disclosure,
particularly when they take the form of projections or estimates. 131 The
issuer has to be honest about its past but need not reveal all doubts about its
future, at least so long as it chooses to remain discretely silent on such
matters rather than saying something affirmatively misleading.
In sum, what the statutory prospectus reveals to whoever chooses to
read it is not necessarily the whole story about the issuer. The SEC has
deliberately restricted the duty to speak to the future, and discourages IPO
issuers from doing so publicly, even if they want to. 132 For this reason
alone, we have to question exactly how much “filtration” value the
preliminary prospectus has in restraining marketing and hype.
In the course of book-building, however, sophisticated institutional
investors demand access to what the issuer knows about its future. This is
the function of non-public road shows and related communications during
the waiting period. It is commonplace for issuers to reveal forward-looking
information to the underwriters and their research analysts, from which
assessments of the future can be made. These, in turn, are shared with key
potential buyers, with an expectation of privacy. This discriminatory
treatment—selective disclosure—is acceptable practice as a means of
encouraging institutions to be forthcoming with their bids, which as we
have seen is key to successful book-building. Recognizing this, the SEC
has explicitly excluded public offerings from the scope of Regulation FD, 133
which otherwise limits selective disclosure to market professionals and
large investors.
All this underscores our basic point. For better or worse, the
publicly-available disclosure found in a preliminary prospectus will often be
distinctly less than everything a reasonable investor would want to know, or
even everything that institutional investors are actually getting from the
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issuer and the underwriters. If this inside information is thoroughly
positive, this may be unproblematic—the institutions will bid up the fixed
offering price, and indeed there may also be aftermarket buyers beyond the
amount of their allocations. In this regard the SEC’s long-standing
willingness (including in Reg FD) to accept this departure from full
disclosure for every investor reflects the value of encouraging the private
information flow from purchasers to the issuer and underwriter that bookbuilding has long embodied.
If the inside information is negative, however, things get more
complicated. At some level of bad news, of course, the institutions will lose
interest entirely—at that point, however, the underwriters would likely have
backed out as well. But as noted earlier, if the negative information is more
ambiguous and the likely demand from the yet-unaware retail public is
strong enough, the better strategy might be to buy but then sell fairly
quickly, especially if the underwriters will tolerate aggressive reselling
and/or settle up with preferential treatment in more attractive future IPOs.
If so, the gap between public and private disclosure, and the use of bookbuilding theory to justify the difference, remain troublesome. We believe
that the Commission should do more here, perhaps in the nature of a special
MD&A requirement for IPOs that sheds more light on how well the
expectations that have been created in the marketplace mesh with the
current realities facing management internally.

IV. CONCLUSION

One of Section 5’s two original functions, its severe restriction on
selling communications outside of the required disclosure, has practically
disappeared. In part this reflects the SEC’s belief, which has grown over
time, that a combination of filtered disclosure and strong liability will take
care of the problem. The extraordinary expansion in information available
through new electronic communication capabilities no doubt has also
contributed. One of our contributions here is to show the concern for
facilitating the flow of information from purchasers to issuers and
underwriters, as illustrated in book building, provides another important
explanation.
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Our survey of the demise of Section 5’s communication rules should
be cautionary, however. Even in a world in which the initial fixed price
buyers are heavily institutional and presumably able to fend for themselves
(and do indeed extract more disclosure than the law requires), the ability to
condition the market is less restrained than it used to be. Aftermarket
buyers, at least, would appear to be more at risk. The justifications for
backing off the old prophylactics—especially the supposed liability
threats—do not bear as much weight as their proponents suggest.
That doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that the demise is bad
public policy. Some level of reform was both necessary and inevitable. 134
Perhaps legal costs go down in a more permissive environment, though
anyone who goes through the 2005 reforms mind-numbing complexity on
when to file a free writing prospectus pursuant to Rule 433 would be
skeptical of this. Another possibility is that the anachronistic
communication rules from 1954 never worked that well for investors
anyway, so that there was little actually lost. 135 We are not aware of
empirical study of the 2005 reforms that would help us tell, and the JOBS
Act is much too recent to make any judgments.
Our strong suspicion, however, is that this turns out to be a story
about the trade-offs between capital formation and investor protection. The
JOBS Act comes close to acknowledging that motivation. There was little
effort in the legislative history to say that investors would be better off
because of these changes—rather, the IPO changes were designed to make
registered public offerings more appealing to entrepreneurs deciding
whether to make one or not. If more jobs come about as a result, we can
hardly say for sure that a moderate erosion of investor protection wasn’t
worth it. Like others, however, we will wait with some skepticism to see
precisely what comes.
For skeptics about IPOs, this story may simply bolster the need for
sweeping changes. The claim that both capital formation and investor
protection would be improved by IPO auctions rather than a continuation of
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book-building has been made in both the economics and legal literature. 136
Or perhaps, as Adam Pritchard suggests, we should just declare IPOs offlimits to retail investors, insisting on a period of seasoning for new issuers
in the private securities markets before they graduate to the public ones. 137
The merits of these proposals are beyond this article. IPOs are
enough part of the popular culture of finance to survive academic or
political doubts about their fairness and efficacy. Their lottery-ticket appeal
is hard to deny. Retail investors’ tendency to become infatuated with an
issuer and support its aftermarket long enough for financial institutions to
make their money is precisely the point.
Even though we are concerned, we do not want to be alarmist about
all this. The bulk of the Securities Act as it applies to public offerings
remains, regardless of the demise of the communications bar in Section 5.
The 2005 reforms and the JOBS Act made moderate reforms, not radical
ones. The SEC is still in control of the registration process, and severe civil
liability still attaches to falsity in the registration statement upon its
effectiveness. But once, there was a political instinct to do more to restrain
the selling process. Why this is less so today is worth more attention than
both legal scholars and investors are giving it.
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